Agentinel / MCP security scan · v0.1.0

/tmp/fleet-demo-mcp.json

FAIL · 2 high
3 servers 5 tools 2026-06-18 17:52 UTC

Findings

2
Total
0
Critical
2
High
0
Medium
2 high

By OWASP Agentic category

ASI02Tool Misuse and Exploitation1
ASI03Identity and Privilege Abuse1

Lethal trifecta

Rule of Two
A
Untrusted inputreads content an attacker can write
1 tool
B
Sensitive datareaches private data or systems
2 tools
C
External actionchanges state or sends data out
1 tool
All three axes are present. A prompt injection through one tool can be chained into reading sensitive data and sending it out.

Capability matrix · Rule of Two

Server / tool Auntrusted input Bsensitive data Cexternal action
notes-reader2 tools
list_files
read_file
slack-notifier1 tool
send_message
web-fetcher2 tools
fetch_doc
search_docs

Findings · most severe first

HIGH

Cross-server lethal trifecta across connected servers

ASI02
fleet

No single server is a full trifecta, but the connected fleet combines all three axes. A (untrusted-input): web-fetcher; B (sensitive-access): notes-reader; C (external-comms): slack-notifier. An agent connected to all of these can be injected through one server and steered to read sensitive data and exfiltrate it through another.

cross-server A+B+C
Break the trifecta: remove one axis, split capabilities across isolated agents, or require human approval for the state-changing / external-comms step.
ASI02 · Tool Misuse and Exploitationconfidence 70%
HIGH

Secret exposed in server configuration

ASI03
server:slack-notifier

Environment variable 'SLACK_TOKEN' in the config holds a hardcoded Slack token.

SLACK_TOKEN=xoxb***
Load secrets from a secret manager or runtime environment, never commit them to config, and rotate any exposed credential.
ASI03 · Identity and Privilege Abuseconfidence 85%