Agentinel / MCP security scan · v0.1.0

github

FAIL · 1 high
1 server 15 tools from published tool specs

Findings

1
Total
0
Critical
1
High
0
Medium
1 high

By OWASP Agentic category

ASI02Tool Misuse and Exploitation1

Lethal trifecta

Rule of Two
A
Untrusted inputreads content an attacker can write
5 tools
B
Sensitive datareaches private data or systems
6 tools
C
External actionchanges state or sends data out
6 tools
All three axes are present. A prompt injection through one tool can be chained into reading sensitive data and sending it out.

Capability matrix · Rule of Two

Server / tool Auntrusted input Bsensitive data Cexternal action
github15 tools
create_or_update_file
create_pull_request
delete_file
get_discussion_comments
get_file_contents
get_me
get_secret_scanning_alert
issue_read
issue_write
list_issues
list_notifications
list_repository_collaborators
merge_pull_request
pull_request_read
push_files

Findings · most severe first

HIGH

Lethal Trifecta / Rule-of-Two violation

ASI02
server:github

This server's combined toolset spans all three lethal-trifecta axes, so an agent using it can be steered to chain them into data exfiltration or unauthorized action. Contributors — A (untrusted-input): github:issue_read, github:list_issues, github:pull_request_read, github:get_discussion_comments, github:list_notifications; B (sensitive-access): github:pull_request_read, github:get_file_contents, github:get_secret_scanning_alert, github:create_or_update_file, github:push_files, github:delete_file; C (external-comms): github:create_or_update_file, github:push_files, github:create_pull_request, github:merge_pull_request, github:issue_write, github:delete_file.

axes present: A+B+C
Break the trifecta: remove one axis, split capabilities across isolated agents, or require human approval for the state-changing / external-comms step.
ASI02 · Tool Misuse and Exploitationconfidence 75%