Untrusted inputreads content an attacker can write
3 tools
B
Sensitive datareaches private data or systems
9 tools
C
External actionchanges state or sends data out
3 tools
All three axes are present. A prompt injection through one tool can be chained into reading sensitive data and sending it out.
Capability matrix · Rule of Two
Server / tool
Auntrusted input
Bsensitive data
Cexternal action
fetch1 tool
fetch
filesystem11 tools
create_directory
directory_tree
edit_file
get_file_info
list_directory
move_file
read_media_file
read_multiple_files
read_text_file
search_files
write_file
slack6 tools
slack_get_channel_history
slack_get_thread_replies
slack_get_users
slack_list_channels
slack_post_message
slack_reply_to_thread
Findings · most severe first
HIGH
Cross-server lethal trifecta across connected servers
ASI02
fleet
No single server is a full trifecta, but the connected fleet combines all three axes. A (untrusted-input): fetch, slack; B (sensitive-access): filesystem; C (external-comms): filesystem, slack. An agent connected to all of these can be injected through one server and steered to read sensitive data and exfiltrate it through another.
cross-server A+B+C
Break the trifecta: remove one axis, split capabilities across isolated agents, or require human approval for the state-changing / external-comms step.
ASI02 · Tool Misuse and Exploitationconfidence 70%
INFO
Two of three lethal-trifecta axes present
ASI02
server:filesystem
This server's toolset already holds two trifecta axes (B:sensitive-access, C:external-comms). Adding a tool with the third axis — or connecting it alongside another server that provides it — would complete the lethal trifecta.
Break the trifecta: remove one axis, split capabilities across isolated agents, or require human approval for the state-changing / external-comms step.
ASI02 · Tool Misuse and Exploitationconfidence 60%
INFO
Two of three lethal-trifecta axes present
ASI02
server:slack
This server's toolset already holds two trifecta axes (A:untrusted-input, C:external-comms). Adding a tool with the third axis — or connecting it alongside another server that provides it — would complete the lethal trifecta.
axes present: A:untrusted-input, C:external-comms
Break the trifecta: remove one axis, split capabilities across isolated agents, or require human approval for the state-changing / external-comms step.
ASI02 · Tool Misuse and Exploitationconfidence 60%